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According to Nietzsche, “there are no facts, only interpretations”. This notion 
has been frequently quoted from the philosopher’s Notebooks1 from the 1880s 
by those who identify with the hermeneutical turn in the 20th century. 
Hermeneutics has replaced metaphysics: while philosophical thinking in 
previous centuries focused on discovering, expressing and protecting truth, 
the greatest challenge today lies in negotiating through the multiplicity of 
interpretations. This paradigmatic shift has influenced not only philosophy, 
but also the social sciences. But before leaving behind the dynamics of plural 
interpretations – the cliché “everything is relative” springs to mind – in the 
hopes of gaining the sense of safety that facts can offer us, we should consider 
the liberating effect of hermeneutics on communities and on ways of thinking 
by admitting that facts in a given community are produced through waves of 
interpretations repeatedly re-defined in the course of social discourses. 
Therefore, neither facts nor interpretations are permanent. The only 
permanent factor is the community that constitutes meaning. Thus 
hermeneutical thinking does not allow for despotism, but acknowledges the 
diversity of possible interpretations and the essential feature of communities: 
that they are interpretative. 
 
Four possible interpretations of religious change 
This point was important to clarify because religious change is often 
discussed, at times fiercely debated, on the level of so-called facts. As a result, 
interpretations are often left un-reflected, as are the communities and their 
interests that determine these. In this study, I elaborate on four possible 
interpretations of religious change. I have chosen models that have been 
successfully used in analysing contemporary religious processes in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Of the four models, the first one, the secularisation 
theory, seems to be the most widely known, although some basic 
misunderstandings about it still prevail. The second one is the theory of social 
drama and liminality developed by the English anthropologist Victor Turner, 
which is particularly appropriate for analysing social turns. The third model is 
related to the concept of civil religion proposed by the American Robert Bellah, 
which is suited to elucidating religious changes and the political processes 
within the region in the past twenty years. Finally, the fourth theory is 
connected to the concept of the empty or free floating signifiers by the 
Argentinean Ernesto Laclau, developed within the context of critical discourse 
analysis, which has only recently been applied to the analysis of religious 
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dimensions. These are all social scientific theories, yet as changes occur not 
only at the social, but also at the individual level, in the innermost personal 
sphere, as expressed in the arts, for example, research into this latter area 
requires other theories and approaches (e.g. psychological). It must be noted, 
however, that no single theory can capture the diverse nature of religious 
phenomena and thus only an interdisciplinary approach that integrates 
various methodological and theoretical considerations can lead to a balanced 
and thorough understanding. 
 
1. Secularization 
Religious Studies turned to the investigation of the reasons for the decreased 
number of believers in European countries in the 1960s. Research at the time 
only managed to focus on Western European countries because data 
gathering in Eastern Europe using proper sociological methods could only 
begin in the 1970s – in which Miklós Tomka took the lead by conducting 
studies first in Hungary and then in other countries of the region. The ideas of 
Bryan Wilson and Peter L. Berger2 led to the composition of the original 
secularisation theory. They maintained that secularisation is a natural 
concomitant of modernity, in the course of which the traditionally religious 
legitimacy of the world had lost its plausibility. This thesis – which Thomas 
Luckmann wrote off as “a modern myth” – has spread very rapidly within 
sociology, triggering fierce debates with a lasting impact that can be felt even 
today. 
Debates about the theory turned towards institutional religions in the 
1990s, focusing on various changes within Christian churches. American 
researchers in particular called attention to the fact that in the US – unlike in 
Europe – religions had been highly institutionalised. As a result, European 
scholars also turned their attention to the institutionalisation of various 
religious activities, surveying the religious scene outside the US. This interest, 
however, has remained within research focused on Christianity.  
For our purposes, three layers or aspects of the secularisation process 
must be considered: (1) areas of the profane have become independent of and 
emancipated from religious institutions and norms; (2) religious beliefs and 
forms of behaviour have lost their significance; and (3) religion has become 
restricted to the private realm. While these features have developed in parallel 
in the various European countries, they differ significantly in their particulars. 
In some cases it can be observed that the strengthening of secularisation in a 
society does not necessarily indicate a decline in religious belief. In fact, 
religion as a societal subsystem may gain strength – especially if traditionally 
it is a non-Christian, syncretic, esoteric, and pluralistic one – and traditional 
Christian religious teachings and world views may emerge as significant social 
factors to be considered on the local and global levels. 
 
                                       
2 Cf. Peter L. Berger et al., eds., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics 
(Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999). 
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Secularization on the macro and meso levels 
In his discussion of secularisation, Dobbelaere3 distinguishes between three 
dimensions: macro, meso and micro. He understands macro to refer to the 
overall societal level, meso to the level of subsystems, and micro to the 
individual level.  
On the macro level, which refers to the whole of society, secularisation 
is not the reason behind the development of modern societies and their 
current characteristics, but is the consequence of functional differences 
between societal subsystems. In fact, with regard to religion, secularisation 
simply points out the relation of religions to other subsystems that are 
becoming or have become autonomous throughout modernity. The 
secularisation theory in this sense captures nothing more than the 
segmentation of societies. This is so much the case that Dobbelaere agrees 
with Wilson and cites his argument that in modernity religion simply begins 
functioning as a subsystem. As a result of the operational logic of functional 
subsystems, religious authority has suffered considerably: religious authority 
and morality, for example, are partly or fully disregarded in the economy and 
the education system, which operate in accordance with their own logic.  
On the meso level, the plurality of religious supply has created a type of 
religious marketplace, where religious communities compete for the souls of 
people, occasionally making agreements about proselytising. New religious 
groups have appeared on the supply side of the religious marketplace, which 
is considered by many as a sign of religious revival as well as a counter-
balance to secularisation. These groups, however, signify a change in the 
social position of religions, which Dobbelaere identified as a mid-level 
manifestation of secularisation. 
 
Secularization on the individual level 
Micro or personal-level secularisation can be captured statistically by 
individualism, bricollage religiosity, lack of churches, and the increasing 
passivity of church members. These members relate to their community as a 
result of choice, which determines their activities and goals within the group, 
as well as allowing them to switch between different religious communities. 
Personal needs enjoy priority, and members’ opinions of their church are 
based on their level of personal satisfaction. As a result, in response to the 
utilitarian attitude of the members, churches and religious communities in 
general move in the direction of services. These changes cannot simply be 
explained by secularisation, as they form part of broader social processes 
characterized by changes in values, the individualization of choice, the loss of 
traditions, an increase in mobility, and utilitarian individualism. The rising 
power of rational choice manifests itself in changes in attitude towards 
religious dogmas: many international studies from the past 30 years confirm 
that faith in the so-called conventional Christian dogmas has been weakening, 
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while other traditional beliefs seem to have emerged as essential segments of 
religious doctrine in Europe, such as the belief in reincarnation. Extremely 
powerful and seemingly persistent debates over faith characterize modern 
societies: the debates about abortion and euthanasia, for example, indicate 
high social relevance of particular religious convictions. 
 
Rational fictionalisation of modern societies  
It is important to underline that the emergence of the secularisation theory in 
the 1960s was enhanced by the recognition that the number of people seeking 
religious experience had been decreasing in modern societies as had the 
impact religious institutions exercised over social life. The theory, however, 
does not criticize religion, nor does it predict its decline. It exercises a wider 
scope: it contextualizes the ways in which rational fictionalisation has taken 
place in modern societies, influencing religion in the process as well. To 
illustrate this with an example: this theory is able to explain not only why the 
number of people attending churches decreases, but also why the number of 
people defining themselves as religious in some way remains the same, or why 
more young people with degrees claim that they believe in God than in 
previous decades. 
 
Secularization and de-secularisation 
The phrase “secular society” has become quite widely used, suggesting that 
religiosity and religious influence in various areas of society nowadays are 
waning more than in previous periods. Trends in the opposite direction, such 
as a steady growth in desire for spirituality, the increasing influence of religion 
on politics, and the boost of esoteric and neo-pagan religions are often 
described as de-secularisation. Secularization processes and secularisation 
theory, however, should not be confused. The first refers to a certain direction, 
while the second reveals and explains reasons and correlations related to it. 
 
The former socialist bloc 
Based on secularisation theory, it can be seen that – similarly to other post-
socialist countries – religious changes in Hungary have not taken place in the 
same manner and in the same direction in the past two decades. Based on 
data collected by Miklós Tomka and Paul M. Zulehner,4 it can be concluded 
that on the macro level the relations between church and state have been 
adequately settled in most countries in the region, even if occasionally serious 
or seemingly serious conflicts have emerged along the way. Religious supply 
has increased on the meso level in all countries, and the various religious 
institutions have thoroughly integrated into the newly emerging civil society – 
either on their own or through the personal motivation of their members. 
Moreover, in certain cases, these institutions are among leading advocates for 
change. As for personal religiosity, the unevenness that characterized most 
                                       
4 See their two surveys of the Aufbruch from 1998 and 2008. 
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countries immediately after the regime change in the 1990s has by now 
disappeared. Data collected in the past ten years show no major changes in 
this regard: they indicate no significant rise or decline in personal religiosity. 
This can be concluded within the interpretative framework of the 
secularisation paradigm based on the various data available. At the same 
time, people familiar with the turbulent political and cultural situation that 
has characterized the various societies of the region may argue for a theory 
that is capable of explaining radical social change. Turner’s theory of social 
drama and liminality provides the framework for such an investigation. 
 
2. Social drama 
While observing the African Ndembu tribe, Turner5 noticed that tribesmen 
dealt with conflicts that had emerged for various reasons according to their 
own rhythm, based on which he developed his theory known as social drama. 
This theory distinguishes between four phases in the process of conflict 
management and, by extension, in the management of major social changes: 
1. Breech: specific groups break away from the norms of the majority or 
the former society; 
2. Crisis: the resultant conflict gradually widens and deepens; 
3. Regressive action: an attempt to resolve problems, often by group 
leaders through mediation and arbitration; 
4. Reintegration of the disturbed social group or recognition of an 
irreparable break or schism. 
Of these four phases, Turner primarily concentrated on the middle two, 
in the course of which preceding relations no longer apply, while the new ones 
replacing them have not yet taken shape. He labelled this middle period the 
liminal phase. As his attention turned towards complex societies, he began to 
use the term liminoid instead of liminal. Reaching beyond the formality of 
rites, this concept captures the matrix of basic structures in complex 
societies. Turner calls the structures characterized by liminality anti-
structures. Based on the concept of liminality, he argued that societies are 
capable of developing. He contended that societies are characterized by a 
dialectic relationship between structures and anti-structures that are 
manifested in liminality and communitas. 
 
Rites of passage and liminality 
Rites of passage accompany or produce the transition from one state to 
another. Turner called the condition of being in-between two states liminality, 
or the threshold state, which is characterized primarily by a void – although 
Turner himself did not use this term. “Liminal entities are neither here, nor 
there,”6 he stated as he described this paradox situation. People in this state 
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are structurally invisible; they are neither alive nor dead, but both alive and 
dead at once. Both individuals and groups can find themselves in such a 
paradoxical situation and can be characterized by the nudity of neophytes, 
who may as well be called abominations, because they are alien in every 
possible way both to the previous state and to the next one. Their behaviour is 
passive, and they are receptive to punishments with the power of purification 
and transformation. Subjects existing in this betwixt state are connected 
through intense comradeship and egalitarianism; differences in social status 
disappear, a process accompanied by homogenisation. 
 
Communities emerging through liminality 
Turner contrasts communities formed through liminality with organized 
societies structured in terms of the law, politics and the economy, in which 
words such as more or less and up or down tend to make sense. On the other 
hand, a liminal phase is characterized by the lack of law and sacrament. 
Communities in this phase are barely or only rudimentarily structured. 
Although the communitas model is powerfully related to religion and the 
sacred, it signifies the sacred that has no status in the transitory phase, and 
not the sacred that is connected to the social status of religion in complex 
societies. Passing beyond this threshold of the sacred, therefore, can lead to a 
higher level of religious and social strata. 
 
The three types of communitas 
Turner distinguishes between three types of communitas: existential or 
spontaneous, normative and ideological. Existential communitas is 
characterized by complete spontaneity, immediacy, and lack of structure. 
Regardless of the historical period in which it emerges, it soon integrates into 
the broader social structure. In normative communitas, the existential 
communitas becomes structured and organized into a social system.  The 
ideological communitas delineates the utopia of the social system, relying on 
the set of spontaneous experiences rooted in the unstructured, immediate 
relations characterizing existential communitas. Each type of communitas is 
essentially temporary in nature, as structure is inevitable after all. Turner 
illustrates this – besides his observations of the Ndembu society – through 
certain examples: the grey friars, who initially represented a communitas and 
then became the Franciscan Order, a regulated and structured community; 
the hippie movement of the 1960s; and the sahajiya movement of Bengal. 
Based on Turner’s works, it may be presumed that he would have applied his 
theory of social drama to describe the regime change in Central Eastern 
Europe.7 
 
Theory of social drama and the regime change  
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In 1990, institutions – including religious denominations – gained 
independence in Hungary as did the public realm. This resulted in a series of 
perplexing upheavals not only in politics and the economy, but in the religious 
arena as well, motivated not only by a wide variety of fantasies and interests, 
but also deep conflicts submerged for numerous decades as history had not 
allowed one to process them. The painful loss of much of the country’s 
territory and population as a result of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the highly 
conservative and nationalist Horthy era that followed (1920-1944), the 
communist political takeover after World War II, the Revolution that 
challenged the government in 1956, and the regime change in 1989-90 all 
represented traumas to be dealt with, primarily not in terms of specific data, 
but rather in terms of their meaning, significance, and status in the shrine of 
social memory. With regard to Christianity, this could be observed through 
the debate that emerged in connection with agents in churches reporting to 
the authorities under socialism. 
 
III. Civil religion 
The system of social relations that rapidly evolved after the regime change – 
and that in some ways has not been settled since then – presented people in 
power, including politicians, scientists, intellectuals and the media with the 
challenge of locating the force that could establish symbolic cohesion in 
society. This is distinct from the uniformity which dictatorships have 
attempted to achieve, fortunately without much success. In terms of social 
sciences, social cohesion simply refers to the ability of the society to operate 
functionally – although this may seem a distant and hardly attainable goal in 
Hungary, one may rightfully note. Social cohesion is also a form of unity, 
through which the members and institutions of a society agree upon the most 
essential values and objectives, even if these are constantly debated because 
of the plurality of views and interests. With no fundamental consensus 
regarding the most basic human and social issues, we see the chaotic and 
unmanageable situation that Tomka – in applying Durkheim’s theory – rightly 
called anomie, or a lack of orientational norms. 
The representation of these basic norms has been traditionally 
considered to be the duty of religion and churches. In Europe, it has been 
Christianity and the Christian churches that have primarily guaranteed the 
metaphysical relational matrix behind human regulation as well as ensuring 
for many centuries that these norms determine socialization, especially 
through educational institutions. Many people today believe that in modern 
societies, in the age of irreligiousness and religious pluralism – especially in 
the Central Eastern European region – this anomie may be improved by 
strengthening national identities. Whatever religion is unable to achieve 
because of secularisation, nationhood may be able to do. After the regime 
change, the motivation to revitalize national pride intensified in the societies 
of this region and powerful forces were mobilized through nationalist rhetoric 
all over Croatia, Slovakia, Poland, etc. – especially in countries with orthodox 
majorities in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. National and nationalist 
ideologies do have their own symbolic systems, rites, heroes, and sacred texts 
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– which scholars of religions consider as being religious by nature, but not 
religious in the traditional sense. Thus, they call these civil religion, which is 
separate, but not in conflict with religions proper. 
 
The main elements of civil religion 
Civil religion in Robert Bellah’s8 understanding – drawing rather on Durkheim 
and Parsons than on Rousseau – is a symbolic referential system that unites 
societies. The main elements of this system are: one, a general belief in the 
existence of a God – not specifically defined – which is reminiscent of the 
Protestant fides fiducialis, a form of faith that establishes a sense of general 
belief in a deity – as opposed to the intellectual acceptance of particular 
tenets. Two, civil religion operates an extensive system of symbols through 
which one can relate to one’s society. With his focus on the United States, 
Bellah defines civil religion as “the institutionalised collection of sacred beliefs 
about the American nation.”9 These national sanctities include parallels 
between the nation’s history and the history of biblical Israel; the partially 
divine nature of the power of the American President; the absolute 
applicability of the Ten Commandments; and finally, the universal mission of 




By elevating the notion of nationhood above society itself, that is, by 
transforming it into a meta-concept, into a kind of religious concept 
figuratively, the theory of civil religion is applicable not only in the case of the 
US, but also to describe changes in other societies. In every place where the 
existing power structure attempts to achieve social cohesion and integrity 
through an idea or where such ideas are being referred to regularly in general 
social discourses, the theory of civil religion may provide a relevant 
interpretative framework. Since civil religion is not highly dogmatic, it 
appears, or may appear, not as a challenge to the various denominations in a 
given society, but rather as a symbolic system of the basic values and most 
common goals in which they all tend to share. As a consequence, non-
religious members and organizations in society do not feel that they are 
absorbed by a particular religion or denomination, as their national religion is 
civil in nature.  
 
Civil religion in the region 
In Hungary as well as in other Eastern and Central European countries, 
political activity regarding civil religion has escalated and then subsided in 
different waves throughout the past two decades. Sanctities, which would 
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have been able to express and to protect national integrities in 1990, soon 
became instruments of political struggles and thus have lost this potential. 
The concept of the nation itself was sacred for various circles and prophets of 
the second public space as of the 1970s but then was transformed into a tool 
to divide societies soon after the regime change. While in Poland and in 
Slovakia, the Catholic faith plays the integrative role of civil religion, and in 
France this is achieved through laïcité, or secularity, Hungary, like other 
countries in the region, has seen all symbols and concepts in this regard 
become desacralized. Identifying and utilizing the elements of civil religion 
through which the most basic social consensus may be achieved represent a 
major undertaking, and it is impossible to predict when and how well this 
may work. At the same time, the logic of civil religion warns us that it must be 
approached in terms of functionality and the level of its substantial content 
must be kept at quite a low level.10 
 
IV. The empty signifier 
Social integration and the maintenance of social cohesion are achieved 
through extremely complicated processes. In the last 20 years, countries of 
the region were faced with the task of dealing with the explosion of the public 
realm, among other things. After the gradual disappearance of censorship, the 
overall presence and power of the global media presented one of the greatest 
challenges. Undertaking social responsibility and practicing power in the 
widest possible sense in fact represent nothing more than a multi-layered, 
complex process of communication, identified as discourse in Communication 
Studies. The founding figures of the classical theory of social discourse were 
Jürgen Habermas and Thomas Luhmann, among others. As for critical 
discourse analysis, the most prominent authors to outline the specific 
relationships between concepts and hegemony are Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe.11 A central concept of their theory is that of the empty, or 
floating, signifier. 
The term was borrowed from semiotics. While in their early works 
Saussure and Wittgenstein as well as others following their lead presumed a 
permanent link between the signifier and the signified, postmodern linguistics 
in particular see a loose connection or none at all, because various meanings 
can be assigned to the same concept. The emphasis, thus, falls on the 
signifier. Empty, or floating, signifiers can be described as having a non-
existent or an unspecific, rather vague signified – like a circle without a focus. 
 
Social field and political discourse 
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In discourse theory, the social field is always open by its very nature, and 
political efforts are aimed at filling up this field. None of the existing societies 
possess completed and closed social dimensions, but are characterized by the 
constant desire to close and complete these. Promising images of this finalized 
stage represent inherent constitutive elements of political discourses. Empty 
signifiers play a crucial role in this process. Political discourse is structured 
solely around these empty signifiers that operate as junction points. 
Emptiness is an essential feature of these points, axes or focal points; 
otherwise, they would not be able to fulfil their role, which is to mark or 
signify, which does nothing but to make the creation of hegemony possible.  
In order for an ideology or political view to be able to emerge as a 
hegemony, it is necessary to generate a shared political identity between the 
social actors with different identities and value systems. Hegemonic ideology 
is able to bring the various social actors into the same system of identity by 
setting a boundary as the result of which the former social plurality is 
reduced to a simple dichotomy. This boundary can be created through the 
empty signifiers. The actors are not interested in the boundary per se, but 
rather in the oppositional contents of the two segments into which the 
political field was divided. The empty signifier, therefore, is a tool in the 
political discourse through which transitory forms of hegemonies can emerge, 
and through which actors in the political field can define themselves in the 
new discourse. 
 
Social discourse on religion 
The concept of the empty signifier introduced by Laclau and Mouffe can be 
adopted in social discourse on religion. If religion plays the role of an empty 
signifier, the concept must be empty, undefined, fluid and general. Thus, 
neither a particular religious tradition nor a specific type of tradition can exist 
in this discursive status. Religion with no specific content can be an empty 
signifier only if the members and groups of a given society articulate their self-
definitions in such a way that they define their own understanding of religion 
along with their relations to it. Whenever there is a moment or time in the 
course of social processes when heterogeneous social actors articulate their 
identity by referring to religion, it functions as an empty signifier in the 
discourse. 
 
Debates and invalidation 
This concept of discourse theory offers the possibility of understanding social 
debates about religion. In the region, public discourses on religion are usually 
amplified before national parliamentary elections and they abate after 
subsequent local elections. The level of general social awareness regarding 
issues of religion is quite low, but religion still seems to an appropriate means 
through which various cultures, personalities and political powers can 
express themselves. and at the same time, religion is also an adequate tool for 
the different cultures, individuals and political forces to express themselves. 
Discourse events like this can be observed as of the beginning of the 1990s, in 
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debates that took place, for example, in connection with the presumed 
introduction of “compulsory religious education” in state schools or with the 
return of a primary school in the town of Dabas-Sári to the Catholic Church. 
Religions and their various institutions and educational components were not 
substantively represented in these social debates, but as a means of political 
disavowal. Discourses on religion have become an instrument for enforcing 
political interests. 
 
Continuing the discourse 
None of the four theories discussed contains a concrete message, upon which 
a safe bastion may be erected against other theories or interpretations. Still, it 
is worth becoming acquainted with these along with other theories as well 
because the plurality of social realities and their religious dimensions allow for 
a multiplicity of interpretations, each displaying a segment of the cultural and 
political spaces of the region, the understanding and operation of which are of 
concern to everyone living here – and perhaps not only to them. The brief 
discussion of these theories above, naturally, would not prepare one for their 
application. It might have been sufficient, however, to illustrate for readers 
interested in the contemporary religious processes the kind of knowledge that 
is required to consider these in a complex way and with a sense of 
responsibility and, for those in power, to discuss these issues.  
I started the discussion of the spectrum of these social theories by 
referring to hermeneutics, and I would like to finish it with a quote from the 
same discipline: “In matters of post-metaphysical contemporary thinking, it 
has become gradually clear that the truth value of a statement does not 
depend on whether it has satisfied the subject. Moreover, when we talk about 
correspondences, we rely on statements that become meaningful in certain 
discourses defined through certain paradigms and the truth value of which 
lies primarily in the fact that a particular community considers it to be true”.12 
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